As kṛṣṇa starts his upadeśa with the eleventh verse of the second chapter, a question arises. If advaita is the absolute truth, why doesn’t kṛṣṇa directly deliver the import of a mahāvākya which forms the underpinning of advaita. The answer is simple – that is exactly what he has done.
na tvevāhaṁ jātu nāsaṁ na tvaṁ (gītā 2.12)
authoritative source … yes
pithy saying … yes
seemingly stating the obvious … yes
seemingly contradictory … yes
It seems to have all the qualities of a mahāvākyam. After all, this verse establishes the sattvam / nityatvam which is one of the three descriptions of the same singular entity which is saccidānanda.
madhusūdana-sarasvatī uses this permanence to establish the śārīra-traya-viveka --
tatra sthūlaśarīrād ātmānaṁ vivektuṁ nityatvaṁ sādhayati (gūḍhārtha-dīpikā)
and this negation necessarily showing both tat and tvam as nirupādhi entities. In the words of ānandagiri --
nirupādhikasya tasya janmādi-rāhityam iti bhāvaḥ (ṭīkā)
śankarānanda sarasvatī takes this furthur to its tattvamasi conclusion, which is the only possibility once the nityatvam and nirupādhikatvam of both tat and tvam are established --
kālatraye’pi sattā-pratipādana-dvarā, dehendriyādibhyo bhinnatvaṁ nityatvaṁ ca sūcayituṁ punaḥ tattvaṁpadārthayoḥ śodhanaṁ, śodhitayoḥ ekatvaṁ ca pratipādayati (tātparya-dīpikā)
svāmī śaṁkarānanda continues with a very long commentary on this verse. After listening to a mahāvākyam, many questions naturally arises, and he puts them to rest very naturally.
Objection – In daily life, there are many “I” entities, all of whom we interact with.
The notion of “I” with regards to someone else changes over time. A child we interact with grows through adulthood and old-age. They are outwardly not the same “I” entity, because the outward appearance has changed. And yet, experience tells us that “I” that changes over time with regards to myself is the same entity. Therefore, mere interaction with an entity in daily life doe not establish that an entity’s sameness of difference. Otherwise, I would establish that the child I interacted with yesterday is different from the old man I will interact with tomorrow. In the same way, plurality in external appearances cannot imply a plurality of the ātmā.
This is summarized as follows;
pratyaya-bhedena pratyayārthasya bhedaḥ iti pratyakṣam asiddham | vyakti-bhedāt ātmano’pi bhedaḥ ityanumānam ca na siddhyati ||
One entity is capable of manifesting and experiencing the world as several entities, just as a single “person” experiences the world, dream world and deep sleep.
deva-gandharva-manuṣyādi-bhedāḥ sarve jāgrat-svapnādi-dehavat ātmano bhogāyatanāni eva, na tu ātma-bheda-dyotakāḥ ||
Or, in daily life, we talk about “my head”, “my foot” and other body-parts, all of which are the same body.
yathā ekasminneva dehe avayava-bhedam upāśritya śiraḥ karah pādaḥ ityādi-vyavahārāḥ, tathā ātmaikatve’pi vyati-bhedam upāśritya, tvam-aham-ayam-ityādi-vyavahāraḥ siddhyati ||
Objection Then saṁsāra and mukti should be global concepts. If one “person” becomes free, everyone should become free. If one “person” is bound, everyone should remain bound.
Just as a single “person” is capable of having many, varied experiences due to the varied nature of karmā, so also, these various bodies (bhogāyatanāni) are capable of the varied experiences. Here, veda itself is pramāṇa “yat karma kurute, tad abhisaṁpadyate”. This is summarized as “phala-bhokṝṇām anekatvam”.
Though the ātmā is one alone, it is reflected in each body, as a result of which the intellect construct in each body has varied experiences. But, the sākṣī underlying all of these constructs is the same singular entity.
A singular intellect consciousness looks out through the eyes, and experiences a single object at a time, through its vastu-buddhi, but the presence of these various vastu-buddhis does not imply varied consciousness. Thus, division of the vṛttis does not imply division of the ātmā.
No comments:
Post a Comment